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TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Among the terms of reference are a stipulation that any “options identified should 
preserve the sovereignty of the Parliament and not include a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights”.3 While this submission primarily discusses possibilities 
within these terms, it also canvasses possibilities that may be considered outside this 
specific term of reference (see Recommendation 5 and Recommendation 6).  
 
                                                     
1 Research Associate, The Australian National University (ANU National Centre for Indigenous Studies).  
2 Professor, ANU College of Law; Director, ANU National Centre for Indigenous Studies, Member (Pacific), United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.  
3 Although sometimes used interchangeably, there is considerable confusion about the terms ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and 
‘parliamentary supremacy’ and what those concepts entail. Many maintain that the Commonwealth Parliament is not sovereign 
in Albert Dicey’s sense because its legislative powers are limited by the Commonwealth Constitution and that the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy is more appropriate to the Australian context (see for example Dawson J in Kable v Director of Public 
Prosecutions for NSW (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 71-6).  
     Opinion also diverges in relation to whether this doctrine is best construed as continuing or self-embracing, depending on the 
interpretation of the British grundnorm or rule of recognition. Dicean jurists generally maintain the sovereignty of parliament is 
one which continues in all respects so parliament may not detract from its own continuing legislative power and can always 
validly amend or repeal any enactment whatsoever (see for example Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR per Brennan 
CJ and McHugh J at 355-7). This view does not readily admit the possibility of effective manner and form provisions binding 
future parliaments (see Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe (1965) AC 172 and Attorney-General for NSW v Trethowan [1932] 
AC 526 (PC) per Dixon J or Harris v Minister of the Interior [1952] 2 SALR 428 which heralded increasing challenges to this 
view by determining that a sovereign legislature need not always be constituted in the same way).  
     Scholars who prefer Herbert Hart tend to interpret the doctrine as being self-embracing, at least procedurally in regards to 
the requirements for future parliaments to exercise their legislative power. Parliaments are therefore bound by current law in 
relation to enacting legislation, which may include specified procedures for valid enactment (such as manner and form 
provisions). This latter view preserves the doctrine because the procedural requirements are not a substantive fetter so current 
and future parliaments retain their legislative power. Manner and form provisions merely provide a non-standard method for the 
exercise of legislative power, thereby offering some measure of protection against hasty or inadvertent amendment or repeal. 
They do not offer protection against clearly expressed, inconsistent, validly enacted legislation or provisions. Constitutional 
amendment would naturally provide the most protection against amendment or repeal.  




PROTECTED & PROMOTED? 
 
Recommendation 1: Natural Persons & Peoples 
Consistent with fundamental principles of international human rights law, human 
rights protection in Australia should extend to natural persons (a larger group than for 
example citizens but a smaller group than legal persons or entities with legal 
personality such as corporations) and peoples (which, as defined by contemporary 
international human rights law, includes Indigenous peoples).  
 
Recommendation 2: Rights to be Protected & Promoted 
Although historically or because of definitional utility rights are often classified in 
groups, levels or generations within a hierarchy, these distinctions (such as between 
individual and collective rights, or between civil and political rights on the one hand 
and economic, social and cultural rights on the other) can be unhelpful in considering 
how to best protect human rights. Fundamental human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent.4 Accordingly, decisions about which rights to protect must not be 
polarised into ‘either/or’ camps. At minimum:  
A. Rights protected and promoted in Australia should extend to every 
covenant and convention that the State has ratified, thereby signalling its formal 
intention to observe those rights, to implement them domestically, and to be legally 
bound under international law in respect of those rights.  
B. In addition, any jus cogens norms (including contemporary interpretation of 
them at international law) which Australia has not formally ratified, endorsed or 
otherwise acceded to must nonetheless be protected domestically, and must not be 
able to be abrogated, suspended or curtailed in any way, notwithstanding the final 
suggestion in Recommendation 4.  
Recommendation 3: Developing Rights or Aspects of Rights  
In order to allow for unforeseeable social, medical and legal developments, and to 
avoid any enumerated rights becoming an inflexible list preventing new rights being 
identified or current rights being reinterpreted in light of clearly established 
developments in international human rights law, not listing a right should in no way 
be held to abrogate or restrict the operation of that right.  
 
Recommendation 4: Curtailing or Balancing Rights 
Rights should only be subject to such limitations or restrictions as are prescribed by 
law and in accordance with international human rights obligations and standards. 
These limitations or restrictions should be non-discriminatory5 and strictly the 
minimum curtailment necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most 
compelling requirements of a democratic society. The minimum curtailment 
necessary may, for instance, involve temporary suspension and subsequent revival 
of a right rather than its extinguishment.  
 
                                                     
4 This was confirmed by the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights and 
endorsed more recently at the 2005 World Summit in New York (paragraph 121).  
5 This non-discriminatory element should be non-derogable in relation to racial discrimination, which should have an absolute 
prohibition on its breach or suspension.  
 




PROTECTED & PROMOTED? 
 
In general, notwithstanding the limited and patchwork legal protection of a very 
limited range of rights, rights are not sufficiently protected and promoted in Australia. 
There is a range of mechanisms for the legal protection of rights in Australia, 
including Commonwealth constitutional protection of express and implied rights, 
State, Territory and Commonwealth legislation, common law protections, judicial 
review and administrative review tribunals. There is also a matrix of organisations 
and practices that promote and provide education about rights, including inter alia 
non-governmental organisations, the Australian Human Rights Commission and 
community legal centres. While these all form a complex network of rights protection, 
this network provides fragile protection of a scant list of rights. The system of 
protection is far from comprehensive in the rights it protects, and far from robust in 
the legal protection it affords even the meagre list of rights protected.  
 




PROTECT & PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
 
Recommendation 5: Constitutional Protection  
Although the terms of reference explicitly exclude “a constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights”, this arguably still leaves room for options that identify possibilities for 
constitutionally protecting human rights either by:  
A. Constitutionally entrenching something less than a “bill of rights” (such as a 
single section constitutionally entrenching a right to be free from discrimination on the 
basis of race); or  
B. Constitutionally amending current sections (such as the ‘defence power’ 
s51(vi)) in order to clarify their operation in relation to specific human right/s or 
aspect/s thereof, with the purpose of better protecting the right/s.  
Notwithstanding these options being considered outside the terms of 
reference they (along with a constitutionally entrenched “bill of rights”) are submitted 
here as the strongest and most comprehensive method of legally protecting and 
promoting human rights, as per the request by the National Human Rights 
Consultative Committee members at a consultation in Canberra that all options be 
submitted even if they may be clearly outside the terms of reference.  
 
Recommendation 6: Legislative Entrenchment  
Assuming Recommendation 5 is adjudged outside the terms of reference or 
otherwise untenable, it is submitted that legislatively entrenching protection of human 
rights is a mechanism which would enable stronger legal protection than ordinary 
legislation while retaining the flexibility to amend, suspend, abolish or repeal without 
resorting to the onerous requirements for constitutional amendment. This could be 
achieved in various ways including inter alia:6  
                                                     
6 Theories about the principle of necessity and interpretations of the British grundnorm that also contemplate the possibility of 
limiting the legislative powers of future parliaments, and the substantial research on protecting civil liberties and human rights in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom through interpretive provisions could also be relevant here. Ann Twomey has also 
suggested in her submission that legislative entrenchment may be achieved via the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth).  
 
A. Doubly7 entrenched manner and form provisions in State legislation. There 
is well established authority for State legislatures enacting valid manner and form 
provisions by laws respecting the constitution, powers and procedures of the 
legislature.8  
B. Doubly entrenched manner and form provisions in Commonwealth 
legislation.9  
Recommendation 7: Legislative Protection  
Assuming the options mentioned in Recommendations 5 and 6 are adjudged 
outside the terms of reference or otherwise untenable, the following possibilities are 
recommended:  
A. Enacting new legislation implementing Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8; 
and/or 
B. Amending existing legislation to augment the protection of human rights. 
Examples may include directions in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) to interpret 
all legislation in light of specified rights, better resourcing the Australian Human 
Rights Commission and making the reporting function in the Human Rights & Equal 
Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) something that Parliament must respond to 
publicly with reasons for its decision, and strengthening the Racial Discrimination Act  
1975 (Cth) or other legislation that has implications for human rights such as the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth) or the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).  
                                                     
7 Unless manner and form provisions are doubly entrenched, they can be circumvented by legislatures amending or repealing 
the manner and form provision via the ordinary course of legislating, thereby avoiding complying with them.  
8 Attorney-General for NSW v Trethowan [1932] AC 526 (PC); Clayton v Heffron (1960) 105 CLR 214, 258-9, 262 per Fullagar 
J, 275 per Menzies J. For a summary of the law in relation to State parliaments and manner and form, see Anne Twomey ‘Does 
anyone really understand manner and form?’ UNSW Constitutional Law Conference, UNSW, Sydney February 2005. Effective 
manner and form provisions change the manner or form in which legislation must be enacted, requiring future parliaments to 
comply with special restrictive procedures for enactments to be valid. This can make amendment and repeal more difficult while 
still enabling legislatures to retain the power to legislate since manner and form provisions cannot constitute a substantive fetter 
on the legislative power of parliaments. Statutorily entrenching rights in this way provides legislatures with the flexibility to 
protect against inadvertent or hasty amendment or repeal enacted in the ordinary course of legislating. 
9 There is scant judicial authority on whether the Commonwealth Parliament can validly enact binding manner and form 
provisions in Commonwealth legislation beyond the constitutional manner provisions that it is already subject to (eg ss57, 128) 
because, to date, it has never done so (for an unsuccessful attempt see the Flags Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) and the Human 
Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) which lapsed with the 1974 double dissolution). However there is sufficient support – from judicial and 
academic commentary and relevant constitutional principles applied in the light of authorities in relevant analogous jurisdictions 
like Canada and the United Kingdom – to indicate that it might nonetheless be possible.  
   The Commonwealth Constitution makes provision respecting the manner of legislation but is silent on the subject of form. This 
could mean that the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact form provisions is wider than its ability to enact binding 
manner provisions. It could, for instance, effectively entrench a right to racial non-discrimination by inserting a doubly 
entrenched provision in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) requiring subsequent inconsistent enactments to expressly 
declare that they operate notwithstanding that Act. The Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl.5(2) and (3) sought to employ a similar 
form provision for entrenching rights which was modelled on s2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 (for judicial recognition of the 
Canadian Parliament’s power to enact binding form provisions see R v Drybones [1970] SCR 282). As a common law 
jurisdiction with a federalist system whose parliamentary supremacy is subject to a written Constitution, the Canadian example 
lends significant weight to the application of this approach in Australia.  
   A manner provision establishing an additional or alternative legislature for enactments on certain areas within the legislative 
power of the Commonwealth (eg race: s51(xxvi)) is another way in which a right might be entrenched (see for example George 
Winterton ‘Can the Commonwealth Parliament Enact “Manner and Form” Legislation?’ (1980) 11 FLR 167). Winterton 
distinguishes a substituted legislature, which would be a manner provision that the Commonwealth Parliament could not validly 
enact (Commonwealth Constitution ss1, 128), from an additional or alternative legislature. The validity of the latter manner 
provision would depend on the interpretation of ss53 and 57 of the Commonwealth Constitution which Winterton considers 
would not prevent the establishment of an alternative legislature, provided it is approved by the Senate (s53) or implemented 
pursuant to s57, a permissive section suggesting one method of resolving disputes among the Houses (see the use of the word 
‘may’ in the section). Other manner provisions such as specifying a special majority required to pass the legislation would be 
ultra vires (Commonwealth Constitution ss23, 40, 128). Proponents of this approach draw similarities between the legislative 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament and that of the United Kingdom Parliament (the latter of which is able to impose 
manner and form provisions on itself), due to the close historical and legal relationship between the two jurisdictions, a shared 
common law environment which influences the interpretation of their institutions of governance and the fact that the 
Commonwealth was established by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. Apart from the additional requirement that the 
Australian Parliament is subject to the Commonwealth Constitution, these provide a basis for submitting that Australia inherited 
similar legislative powers as the United Kingdom Parliament. The High Court has expressed a similar view in relation to the 
principles of responsible government, prerogative powers and separation of powers (the Court examined it in relation to 
delegating legislative power in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 per Evatt 
and Dixon JJ at 117-8 and 101-2; see also Attorney-General for Australia v R (Boilermakers’ Case) [1957] AC 288, 321). In the 
absence of a constitutional provision to the contrary, the Commonwealth Parliament could therefore arguably make binding 
manner and form enactments.  
 
 
Recommendation 8: Encouraging a Human Rights Culture via Education 
Australia should signal the importance of human rights protection inter alia: 
A. with better education about the current level of human rights protection both 
in Australia and internationally; and  
B. by sponsoring and encouraging debate about human rights in a variety of 
arenas (such as government departments, agencies and organisations especially 
those service providers who have a lot of contact with the public [eg the police, 
Centrelink], educational institutions at all levels); and  
C. by better resourcing bodies that protect and promote human rights (such as 
the Australian Human Rights Commission, non-governmental organisations and 
community legal centres).  
D. by better informing people of Australia’s international stance regarding 
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